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Introduction 
On the 25 August 2011, a mathematics lecturer named Ronnie Fraser, through his lawyer 
Anthony Julius, filed a claim in the Central London Employment Tribunal against the 
University and College Union (UCU) under sections 57 and 26 Equality Act 2010. The act’s 
aim is to protect individuals in the public sector from unfair treatment, including harassment 
and other forms of direct discrimination. Fraser alleged that the union had harassed him as a 
Jewish member (“Jewish” being a “protected characteristic” in terms of both a race and a 
religion under section 26 Equality Act) by engaging in “unwanted” antisemitic “conduct” 
which manifested itself in acts and omissions informed by hostility to Israel and the Zionist 
project. These were as follows:
1
 
 annual boycott resolutions against Israel and no other country in the world 
 conduct of the debates at the annual UCU Congress 
 moderating of the activists’ lists and the penalising of anti-boycott activists 
 failure to engage with people who raised concerns about antisemitism 
 failure to address members’ resignations on the grounds of antisemitism 
 refusal to meet the OSCE’s special representative on antisemitism 
 hosting of South African trade unionist Bongani Masuku after he had been found 
guilty of antisemitic hate speech by South Africa’s Human Rights Commission, and 
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 repudiation of the EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism which addresses 
Israel-related antisemitism.  
These acts and omissions, alleged Fraser, constituted a “course of conduct” by the union 
which amounted to institutional antisemitism. On 22 March 2013, the Tribunal delivered a 
lengthy judgment dismissing all ten grounds of Fraser’s complaint as unfounded and mostly 
out-of-time.
2
 
There is a widely held belief in Britain that Jews benefit from the protection of equality 
legislation. For example, the authors of an online essay, “In These Times: A Statement on  
Contemporary European Anti-Semitism,” state that “the statutes against discrimination offer 
sufficient legal guarantees of equality [for Jews].”3 While this is true in theory, this does not 
appear to be the case in practice. To date, every Jewish claimant in a reported discrimination 
case in England has failed in their claim against a Christian or post-Christian secular 
defendant.
4
 This finding supports the work of critical-race theorists who claim that anti-
discrimination legislation does not effectively combat racism because it fails to understand the 
nature of racism, because it is interpreted by judges who fail to understand the experience of 
racism, and because the racism that pervades our society also pervades our legal system and 
may, in fact, be uncovered in allegedly neutral concepts, procedures, analytical approaches 
and judicial decisions.  
This chapter will consider a specific critical-race theory claim in relation to the 
judgement in Fraser v UCU, namely, that courts adhere to legal formalism in cases where the 
claimant is a member of a racial minority, resulting in the law’s failure to address the nature 
and experience of racism. My concern is not so much with the construction of the legislation, 
but with the institutional and ideological context in which it is supposed to function. 
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1.  The Courts’ Adherence to Legal Formalism Results in the Law’s Failure to Address 
the Experience and Nature of Racism  
In her book, An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness and English Law,
5
 Didi Herman 
notes the practice of English courts to adhere to legal formalism in a variety of cases 
involving Jewish litigants and Jewish issues. She believes that legal formalism is a judicial 
route that is consciously chosen “in order to marginalise extrinsic political factors,” that is, to 
deem certain facts irrelevant to the legal issue before the court.
6
 This can be illustrated by the 
1947 case of R v Sec of State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte Greenberg.
7
 The case involved an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to 4,500 Jewish European passengers on 
three ships, on the grounds that they were being unlawfully detained by the British 
Government off the coast of British Mandate Palestine. The judge denied the writ without any 
reference to the Holocaust, or indeed, without any reference to any of the difficulties that led 
to the passengers’ flight to Palestine.8 Nor did he once mention the fact that the three ships’ 
passengers were Jewish, despite their lawyer referring to them throughout the case as 
“displaced Jews.”9 The judge defined the legal issue before him narrowly so as to make these 
facts irrelevant to the case’s determination.  
Instead, he concentrated on the fact that Jewish immigration to Palestine had been 
acutely controversial for many years, such that the British Government and the Government 
of Palestine found it necessary to impose restrictions on it, and he referred to the ships’ Jew-
ish passengers throughout as “illegal immigrants.”  Noting that they were intercepted by His 
Majesty’s ships off the Palestinian coast and returned to the South of France where they were 
informed that, unless they landed by a certain time, they would be redirected to Hamburg, the 
judge concluded that the passengers’ refusal to disembark meant that they had remained on 
the ships voluntarily and, therefore, had not been illegally restrained. He denied the writ of 
 106 
 
habeas corpus on this narrow ground, ignoring the passengers’ situation at any point prior to 
their arrival in France. 
Herman argues that judicial blindness to certain facts serves to impose Christian norms 
and values, which have become synonymous with English secular norms and values, on the 
law.
10
 Norms are the standards of proper or acceptable behaviour, and values are the ideals or 
beliefs shared by a culture about what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable. As illustrated 
by the Greenberg case, legal formalism’s imposition of Christian norms and values renders 
the Jewish experience irrelevant. This results in the claims of Jewish litigants being denied 
justice and their lived experiences marginalised. 
Herman claims that legal formalism is ideologically driven and is informed by 
“extrinsic projects of racialisation.”11 She defines “racialisation” broadly as the portrayal of 
Jews as inferior or different. Here, she draws on the work of critical-race theorist Peter 
Fitzpatrick who has written about the privileging of legal formalism in cases involving anti-
black racism.
12
 Herman’s work makes a welcome contribution to critical race theory because, 
despite being an expanding and diverse field, there has been very little scholarship on the 
law’s relationship with antisemitism until the publication of her book in 2010. 
 
2.  The Privileging of Legal Formalism in Fraser v UCU 
Legal formalism may be described as the liberal position that says that law can be separated 
from the social world in which it is embedded. It draws a distinction between pure law and its 
social, economic and political contexts, denying the importance of context in understanding 
the law. The privileging of legal formalism in cases involving race prevents the law from 
addressing racism because race or ethnicity is an account of social being; it is the lived 
experience. 
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A good illustration of the privileging of legal formalism resulting in the law’s failure to 
address the experience and nature of antisemitism may be found at several points in the 
judgment of Fraser v UCU. First, we shall consider the Tribunal’s interpretation of the 
statutory test for “harassment” in section 26 Equality Act. The section defines “harassment” 
as “unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic.” To qualify as 
“harassment,” the conduct must “violate the victim’s dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.” In deciding whether the conduct has had 
that effect, the tribunal must take into account the victim’s perception under section 26 (1) 
(b). This is a subjective test. It must also take into account the case’s other circumstances and 
whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect under section 26 (4) (c). This is an 
objective test. 
To interpret the subjective component of section 26, the Tribunal was required to focus 
on Fraser’s realm of experience in the UCU. This it obtained from his written account in his 
witness statement and his oral evidence during examination and cross-examination. The 
Tribunal then had to decide whether account satisfied the statutory language of section 26 (1) 
(b) so as to amount to unlawful harassment. The Tribunal decided to give the statutory 
language a strict, narrow construction so as to deny Fraser’s experiences of antisemitism in 
the union. Stressing that it “must not cheapen the significance of [the] words [used]”13 in the 
statute, it declared that an effect amounting to “harassment” had not been made out by Fraser 
who had used words such as “upsetting,” “disappointment,” “troubled,” “hurt” and “saddened 
and amazed” to describe the effect the union’s conduct had on him.14 The Tribunal thought 
that these words indicated “minor upsets” caused by “trivial acts” rather than antisemitic 
harassment.
15
 It said, “[N]o doubt [Mr Fraser] found some of the [anti-Israel] motions and 
some things said in the course of the debates upsetting, but to say that they violated his 
dignity or created an adverse environment . . . is to overstate his case hugely.”16 This was 
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despite the fact that Fraser impressed the Tribunal as a “sincere witness” whose “displays of 
emotion” during his evidence had not been synthetic.17 The Tribunal attributed Fraser’s 
emotion to the fact that the outcome of the litigation was important to his “passionate belief” 
in the pro-Israel political campaign within the union,
18
 rather than to his reliving his 
experiences of antisemitism while giving evidence.  
In this way, the Tribunal denied Fraser’s experiences of antisemitism within the UCU 
because he did not relay his experiences using the correct language. This constitutes the 
privileging of legal formalism. By denying that Fraser’s subjective account satisfied the 
statutory language, the Tribunal imposed Christian or secular norms and values on the law 
and this served to marginalise the Jewish experience. The lack of recognition or 
misrecognition of Fraser’s suffering within the union is deeply problematic. Indeed, it has 
been observed by critical legal philosophers that the “law’s abstraction and formalism is a 
type of disrespect that calls for greater sensitivity to social context and to individual need and 
desire.”19 
The question is, why did the Tribunal construe the statutory language so narrowly? It 
did, after all, have a choice. It is generally acknowledged by legal scholars that, while the 
meaning of legal text appears to be determinate, judges are free to interpret it as they choose. 
This is particularly the case with statutory wording, where even the literal interpretation of a 
word can yield several different meanings. Is it the case that the Tribunal wanted to deny 
Fraser’s claim because it really did believe that his professed experiences of antisemitism did 
not amount to anything more than “minor upsets” caused by “trivial acts”? If so, then this 
might suggest that the Tribunal could not grasp Fraser’s subjective experience of antisemitism 
in the union because his reality was outside their realm of experience. Critical race theorists 
have observed that judges cannot understand racial discrimination because it is positional, that 
is, it requires an understanding of the lived reality of race. In the case of people of colour, 
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judges are said to be blind to the reality of the structured disadvantages that cause their 
marginalisation and exploitation, and instead individualise and atomise discrimination into a 
series of disputes. In the case of Jewish litigants, the tendency of judges and other decision 
makers appears to be to individualise and atomise the Jewish experience of antisemitism into 
a series of incidents that are insignificant and do not rise to the level of antisemitism. For 
example, not only did the Tribunal in Fraser’s case characterise his experiences of 
antisemitism within the UCU as a series of “minor upsets” caused by “trivial acts,” but the 
Shami Chakrabarti Report concluded that the antisemitism in the Labour Party that led to the 
suspension of many members – including Naz Shah, MP for Bradford West, and Ken 
Livingstone, former Mayor of London – was merely a “series of unhappy incidents.”20 
Similarly, in a recent antisemitism complaint brought by a Jewish student against Sheffield 
Hallam University, the university administrator who decided the outcome categorised a 
student society’s antisemitic social media output as merely “controversial and provocative,” 
despite its replication of blood libels.
21
 In this trivialisation process, practices of antisemitism 
are denied, along with their political importance, and the Jewish complainant is constructed as 
overly sensitive, not as a victim of harassment.   
In fact, the Tribunal should have been more sensitive to Fraser’s subjective experiences 
of antisemitism within the Union because his fear, distress and panic were evident during his 
cross-examination, just as it had been evident during his speech to Congress in May 2011.
22
 
This was the Congress at which members debated a motion to formally disassociate the UCU 
from the EUMC Definition on the grounds that it was a tool “to silence debate about Israel 
and Palestine on campus.”23 During the debate, Fraser made an impassioned plea to Congress, 
and this was made available in evidence to the Tribunal. He said: 
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I, a Jewish member of this union, am telling you, that I feel an antisemitic mood 
in this union and even in this room. I would feel your refusal to engage with the 
EUMC definition of antisemitism, if you pass this motion, a racist act…. You may 
disagree with me. You may disagree with all the other Jewish members who have 
said similar things. You may think we are mistaken. But you have a duty to listen 
seriously. Instead of being listened to, I am repeatedly told that anyone who raises 
the issue of antisemitism is doing so in bad faith.
24
 
 
Given the fact that Fraser demonstrated fear, distress, and panic which ought to have been 
apparent to the Tribunal, other possible reasons for its failure to accept that his subjective 
account of his experiences within the UCU constituted antisemitic harassment will be 
considered.  
 
3  The Tribunal’s Failure to Address the Nature and Experience of Antisemitism 
One possible reason could be that the Tribunal’s denial of Fraser’s subjective experiences of 
antisemitism lay in the statutory wording of section 26 Equality Act. Legal theorist Clare 
Dalton has noted that the law shapes all stories into particular patterns of telling, that it 
favours certain kinds of stories, disfavours others, and even makes it impossible to tell certain 
types of stories.
25
 It may be, on this view, that antisemitism is one story that is impossible to 
tell because it is not considered to be a serious problem (as in this case). In fact, most people 
in Britain associate antisemitism with the Holocaust and regard it as a symptom of fascism, an 
outdated ideology. These people tend to think that all criticism of Israel is legitimate and do 
not understand the correlation between hostility to Israel and antisemitism. To make matters 
worse, the telling of the complainant’s story by means of examination in the courtroom is an 
“impoverishing exercise” because “the infinitely rich potential that we call reality is stripped 
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of detail, of all but a few of its aspects.”26 Not only is reality misrepresented in the courtroom 
but antisemitism in any event is not as readily recognisable as, say, anti-black racism, sexism, 
or homophobia. This is especially true of contemporary Israel-related antisemitism, also 
known as “the new antisemitism,” which is frequently disguised in an anti-Zionist narrative 
and the language of human rights. As Robert Fine helpfully explains: 
Antisemitism may or may not be openly expressed. It may linger in discursive 
nooks and crannies of well-honed antisemitic motifs: conspiracy, secret power, 
blood lust, etc. As in the case in the presentation of self in everyday life, the forms 
of appearance of the new antisemitism may not immediately reveal what lies 
behind the scenes.
27
 
Antisemitism is a complex phenomenon. Its interpretation demands a subtle and nuanced ap-
proach that resists easy conclusions. Its objective manifestation cannot, therefore, be easily 
observed from the subjective narration of personal experience. 
A more plausible explanation, however, is that the Tribunal chose to construe the 
statutory wording in section 26 Equality Act to deny Fraser’s subjective experience of 
antisemitism because it disliked the allegation of contemporary antisemitism, preferring to 
regard the UCU’s irrational hostility to Israel in terms of free political speech. This preferred 
explanation has wide support within the judgment.  
First, the Tribunal refused to rule on a meaning or definition of antisemitism on the 
grounds that there were legitimately held differences on what constitutes antisemitism, 
concluding that the range of views presented to the Tribunal, including where the line should 
be drawn in relation to when criticism of Israel becomes antisemitic, is the “stuff of political 
debate.”28 The Tribunal stated that “the obvious difficulty confronting anyone seeking to 
grapple with this controversy is that the arguments cannot meet each other head on unless and 
until participants agree on what is meant by ‘anti-Semitism’ . . . We cannot escape the gloomy 
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thought that a definition acceptable to all interested parties may never be achieved and count 
ourselves fortunate that it does not fall on us to attempt to devise one.”29 This refusal to settle 
on a definition of antisemitism was curious given the fact that Fraser’s claim was for unlawful 
antisemitic harassment. As the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee on 
Antisemitism in the UK reported in 2016, it is “extremely difficult to examine the issue of 
antisemitism without considering what sorts of actions, language and discourse are captured 
by the term” and “defining the parameters of antisemitism [is] central to the question of what 
should be done to address this form of hate.”30 A similar refusal to define antisemitism was a 
feature of the Shami Chakrabarti Inquiry. Chakrabarti reported that she saw “no need to 
pursue an age-old and ultimately fruitless debate about the precise parameters of race hate,” 
despite the fact that her brief was to examine antisemitism in the Labour Party.
31
 Further, in 
the case of the student antisemitism complaint against Sheffield Hallam University, the 
university was unable to provide a definition of antisemitism and explicitly rejected the 
EUMC Working Definition which the student and his legal representatives had asked it to 
adopt in order to decide the outcome of the complaint.
32
 It is noteworthy that a definition of 
antisemitism was considered impossible, unnecessary or ill-advised in cases whose very 
purpose was formally to decide antisemitism’s presence or absence. It may be logically 
assumed that the rejection of a definition of antisemitism in each case was part of a strategic 
approach to denying antisemitism.  
Second, the Tribunal discarded all the evidence of antisemitism as inauthentic or 
irrelevant. It did this by discrediting as inauthentic the evidence given by many of Fraser’s 
witnesses as “the mere ventilation of opinions” and by describing some of his witnesses as 
“playing to the gallery,” as “scoring points,” as “behaving in a tactical manner” and as being 
“untruthful.”33 On the grounds that there was no agreement on the meaning of antisemitism, it 
wholly discarded as irrelevant Julius’ cross-examination of UCU witnesses about the issue of 
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antisemitism, for “without such common ground, questions put to witnesses for the 
Respondents seeking to elicit a view on whether such-and-such a comment ‘was’ or ‘was not’ 
anti-Semitic lacked any meaning.”34 It dismissed all the evidence of antisemitism in the union 
with the words, “[…] we had to remind ourselves frequently that despite appearances, we 
were not conducting a public inquiry into anti-Semitism but considering a legal claim for 
unlawful harassment.”35 It was a claim for unlawful antisemitic harassment but this did not 
prevent the Tribunal from ignoring all evidence of antisemitism. This amounts to a denial of 
antisemitism. Moreover, the idea that the parties to a claim for antisemitic harassment have to 
agree on the meaning of antisemitism before the claim can be considered by the Tribunal, 
makes the protection afforded to Jews by section 26 Equality Act redundant. 
Despite its denial of antisemitism, the Tribunal did manage to portray itself as 
sympathetic to Jewish persecution and suffering. It did this by making references to the 
Holocaust. At the beginning of its judgment, the Tribunal introduced Fraser as “the child of 
Jewish refugees who fled Nazi Germany in 1939” and advised that “members of his family 
died in the Holocaust.”36Later, the Tribunal made an oblique reference to the Holocaust and 
other atrocities with the words, “so long and terrible has been the persecution of the Jewish 
people through history.”37 Paradoxically, the Tribunal’s acknowledgement of antisemitism via 
the Holocaust and other historical persecution only serves to legitimise its denial of Fraser’s 
claim of contemporary antisemitism against the UCU. The references associate antisemitism 
with state-sponsored genocide and consign it to history, making it seem like a relic of the past 
and a symptom of a defunct ideology.
38
 In this way, antisemitism is removed from 
contemporary discourse about Israel and Zionism. Herman notes that English judges 
frequently use the Holocaust in cases involving Jews as a “mnemonic device” to achieve 
certain purposes.
39
 And there is little doubt that this achieves a dual purpose: the portrayal of 
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judicial sympathy for past Jewish persecution, while denying the reality of contemporary 
Israel-related antisemitism. 
To return to the privileging of legal formalism, critical race theorists claim that 
formalists use abstract concepts like "reasonableness" to mask choices and value judgments. 
This can be illustrated in the Tribunal's interpretation of the objective component of section 
26 Equality Act. The Tribunal said that, even if it was satisfied that Fraser's subjective 
perception satisfied the statutory test for harassment under section 26 (1) (b), it would not be 
reasonable for it to have that effect under section 26 (4) (c). This was because Fraser was a 
willing participant in the political arena. The Tribunal stated:
40
 
[Mr Fraser] is a campaigner. He chooses to engage in the politics of the union in 
support of Israel and in opposition to activists for the Palestinian cause. When a 
rugby player takes the field he must accept his fair share of minor injuries. 
Similarly, a political activist accepts the risk of being offended or hurt on 
occasions by things said or done by his opponents (who themselves take on a 
corresponding risk).  These activities are not for everyone. Given his election to 
engage in, and persist with, a political debate which by its nature is bound to 
excite strong emotions, it would, we think, require special circumstances to justify 
a finding that such involvement had resulted in harassment. 
The Tribunal interpreted the statutory requirement of "reasonableness" from the perspective 
of a political activist rather than from the perspective of a Jewish union member with a 
connection to Israel or, indeed, from the perspective of a victim of antisemitism. The Tribunal 
had a choice as to whose reasonableness to adopt. Its choice wrongly assumes that minorities 
who are politically active in the fight against racism have greater thresholds of fortitude than 
those who are not. This shows a marked failure to address the experience and nature of 
racism. Moreover, David Hirsh has noted that “this reasoning results in the position that since 
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Fraser took on the responsibility of defending Israel, he should accept some antisemitism as 
part of the game.”41 In other words, Fraser brought the trouble on his own head; he was 
responsible for his own experiences of antisemitism – except that the Tribunal denied that it 
was antisemitism that he experienced. 
The idea that the Jewish claimant brought the trouble on his own head by his own 
behaviour is not new to the English judiciary. In the 1980 case of Seide v Gillette Industries 
Ltd., a Jewish employee who complained under the Race Relations Act 1976 that he had been 
transferred by his employer to a lower position at a lower wage because of antisemitism, was 
told by the Industrial Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal that his transfer had been 
caused by his own inappropriate behaviour and that “race” was not an “activating cause.”42 
This was despite the fact that he had been on the receiving end of antisemitic remarks by one 
of his colleagues which, in the words of both Tribunals, were “clearly to be deplored.”43 
Similarly, a Jewish claimant’s behaviour was declared to be the cause of the problem in 
another employment case in the early 1980s. In Garnel v Brighton Branch of the Musicians’ 
Union, the claimant, a Jewish member of the Musicians’ Union, was told by the Industrial 
Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal that the failure of the Brighton Branch to 
nominate him to sit on a committee, and his resulting suspension from the Union when he 
complained about it, was not racially motivated. Rather, “if there was discrimination . . . it 
was not because the applicant was a Jew but because of his own personal behaviour.”44 The 
Jewish claimant’s behaviour took the form of his “engendering a feeling of anti-Semitism 
which did not yet exist.”45 In other words, the Jewish claimant in Garnel got what he 
deserved, just as the Jewish claimant in Seide got what he deserved, just as the Jewish Ronnie 
Fraser got what he deserved. According to Herman, the finding that the harm experienced by 
the Jewish claimant is self-induced shows the presence of racist thinking in judicial 
discourse.
46
 What is interesting is that contemporary English judges do not appear to think of 
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Jews any differently from earlier English judges,
47
 for the formalist interpretation of the 
concept of “reasonableness” by the Fraser Tribunal was a vehicle to blame Fraser for his own 
suffering within the union.  
In fact, a move away from formalism is required by section 26 Equality Act as it 
protects the claimant from environmental harassment. As the Fraser Tribunal notes, 
“legislation that protects from harassment is meant to create an important jurisdiction.”48 The 
claimant’s experiences and knowledge are important in this jurisdiction and this is why the 
subjective element of section 26 enables the claimant to speak about his perception and relay 
his experiences to the law, for these must be taken into account by the Tribunal. The 
jurisdiction is also constitutive of environment. Indeed, emphasis on environment was 
considered by Parliament to be an apt approach for identifying and remedying the amorphous 
nature of sexism, racism, and antisemitism. This involves adopting a contextualised approach 
to judgment, which formalism rejects. The Tribunal is expected to consider the utterances, 
attitudes and acts that are usually cast outside of the law’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal did seem 
to do this in some parts of its judgment. It took note of the “emotional energy” that the 
conflict had generated
49
 and said it could find no evidence of the “atmosphere of 
intimidation” alleged by Fraser.50 It acknowledged the whispers and half-heard comments that 
a microphone would not pick up during a debate
51
 and, as we have seen, noted with disdain 
the witnesses for Fraser who “played to the gallery.”52 It appears that the Tribunal was only 
prepared to move away from formalism and adopt a contextualised approach to judgment 
when it permitted a finding that went against Fraser.  
The Tribunal also adopted legal formalism to interpret the principle of third-party 
responsibility. The principle of third-party responsibility was crucial to the case because 
section 57 Equality Act provides that a trade union must not harass a member. To satisfy 
section 57, therefore, a central question in Fraser’s case was “what acts and omissions that 
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Fraser complains of are properly to be regarded as the responsibility of the trade union, the 
UCU?” In other words, who was the UCU for the purposes of section 57 Equality Act? Fraser 
argued that the UCU was the union, Congress, officials, and officers who act or omit to act 
with the authority of the union. That authority was expressed by policies of the union, 
assurances given to members on behalf of the union, the union’s rules, and the internal “life of 
the union” over which the union exercises control. In support of this argument, Julius cited 
the High Court case of Vowles v Evans & Others which ruled that when an unincorporated 
corporation makes promises to its members, it can be held to those promises.
53
 Julius argued 
that this legal principle mattered because the UCU wanted to be regarded as a union with zero 
tolerance for antisemitism and wished to promote an environment in which members 
flourished. It was the gap, therefore, between what was promised by the UCU and what was 
delivered, as experienced by its members, that was at the heart of Fraser’s case.54 For 
example, there was an institutional incapacity on the union’s part to recognise resignations 
due to antisemitism. When cross-examined on this point during the Tribunal hearing, the 
union official in charge of membership matters explained that the reason why a particular 
member’s resignation was put in the “Israel/Palestine” pigeonhole was because the union did 
not have a category for resignations when the reason given was “antisemitism.” Also, 
whenever a Jew in the union wanted to speak about antisemitism, it was as if he was speaking 
an unintelligible language because there was a structural incapacity to hear what was being 
said, and this was part of the harassment. Accordingly, for the purposes of section 57 Equality 
Act, the perpetrator of the harassment includes the department that cannot recognise 
antisemitism
55
.  
However, the Tribunal did not agree that the perpetrator of the harassment for the 
purposes of section 57 Equality Act included Congress, officials and officers. It adopted legal 
formalism to interpret the principle of third-party responsibility in order to rule that any 
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“unwanted conduct” for the purposes of section 26 Equality Act was not properly to be 
regarded as that of the UCU. Rather, it was the “unwanted conduct” of the union’s Congress 
and members, separate from the UCU. The UCU could therefore not be liable for its 
members’ conduct or for motions passed at Congress because “the concept of institutional 
responsibility . . . is not known to our law.”56 This conclusion effectively disposed of Fraser’s 
case in its entirety. 
The Tribunal was able to support this conclusion by distinguishing the Vowles case on 
its cause of action: Vowles was a personal injury case involving the principle of vicarious 
liability, rather than a claim against a trade union for harassment. This is arguably a narrow 
technical point that is immaterial to the general principle of institutional responsibility that 
Vowles promulgated. The practice of distinguishing a precedent case on a narrow technical 
point, such as the cause of action, in order to avoid its application was noted by the eminent 
legal realist, Karl Llewellyn, as one of sixty-four “impeccable judicial techniques” for 
avoiding an awkward precedent, that is, a precedent that the court does not want to follow and 
apply in the case before it.
57
  The Tribunal could just as easily have applied the Vowles 
principle of institutional responsibility to Fraser’s case in order to rule that, for the purposes 
of section 57, the UCU also included Congress, officials and officers who act or omit to act 
with UCU’s authority. This is because of the indeterminacy of legal doctrine which allows 
any legal principle to be used to yield competing and contradictory results. Moreover, the 
principle of institutional responsibility ought to have been applied in Fraser’s case as a policy 
matter. No claim against a trade union for environmental harassment under sections 26 and 57 
Equality Act will succeed without its application. Rejecting the principle of institutional 
responsibility in Fraser’s case meant that the Tribunal could ignore as irrelevant all evidence 
of “unwanted conduct” on the part of the officers, officials and Congress, thus disposing of 
Fraser’s case. This was an exercise in legal formalism insofar as it ignored context and 
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thereby permitted a strategic blindness to the facts presented by the claimant. It was, 
moreover, ideologically driven because it was a route that facilitated the denial of Fraser’s 
antisemitism claim.  
Legal formalism was also evident in the Tribunal’s decision to treat the ten grounds of 
Fraser’s complaint as ten separate complaints and to declare nine of them out-of-time. A 
complaint must be presented to an Employment Tribunal within three months of the conduct 
complained of and only the last ground of Fraser’s complaint, the UCU’s disavowal of the 
EUMC Definition of Antisemitism at Congress in May 2011, met that requirement. Fraser 
argued that the ten grounds of his complaint should be treated as a single course of conduct 
and that their cumulative effect amounted to institutional antisemitism. The Tribunal, 
however, rejected this argument. Noting that harassment can take the form of a series of 
minor acts and omissions, the Tribunal left Fraser’s “cumulative effect” argument until after it 
had disposed of each ground of his complaint for substantive reasons, saying that “the 
difficulty [with this cumulative effect argument] is that the Claimant has failed to show a 
succession of events (or non-events) about which any complaint against the Respondents can 
sensibly be made.”58 By treating each ground of Fraser’s complaint as a separate complaint, 
the Tribunal was denying the overall context of Fraser’s experience which is essential for an 
environmental harassment claim under section 26 Equality Act. This supports the critical-race 
theory view that the privileging of legal formalism in anti-discrimination cases fails to address 
the experience and nature of racism, for the latter cannot be atomised into a series of 
individualised incidents and often presents itself as institutional racism.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed several examples of the Tribunal’s adoption of legal formalism in 
Fraser v UCU in order to justify its denial of Fraser’s claim for institutional antisemitism 
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against the UCU. A common thread in the analysis has been the exclusion of the “political,” 
albeit with “political” as a dangerously free-floating factor. Thus, Fraser’s passion was merely 
“political,” hostility to Israel was merely “political,” Fraser was merely a “political 
campaigner.” We have seen the “political” excluded at the general level of the law with, for 
example, a strict, narrow interpretation of section 26 (1) (b) Equality Act, which insulated it 
against policy and thereby prevented different forms of linguistic expression from satisfying 
the subjective test for “harassment.” We have seen the “political” excluded at the level of 
legal principle with the strict, narrow application of the principle of “institutional 
responsibility,” confining it to personal injury cases and the issue of vicarious liability, 
thereby preventing its application to Fraser’s case on important policy grounds. We have also 
seen the exclusion of the “political” at the specific level of evidence, with evidence of 
antisemitism treated as inauthentic or irrelevant. It is the exclusion of the political at the 
specific level of evidence that is central to the critique offered by critical-race theory because 
it is a strategic blindness to facts on ideological grounds. The mixture of the general and 
specific exclusion of the political in Fraser v UCU sensitises us to the different ways in which 
the judicial application of dominant Christian or post-Christian secular norms is exclusionary, 
harmful and ultimately racist.  
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